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Chapter 5
Impact of the Pension Protection Act on
Financial Advice: What Works and What
Remains to Be Done?
Lynn Pettus and R. Hall Kesmodel, Jr.
The US Congress addressed several issues important to both defined
benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension plans with the 2006
enactment of the Pension Protection Act (PPA). Certain aspects of the PPA
are widely viewed as improvements to the existing system, including
changes to certain funding rules for DB plans and the explicit endorse-
ment of auto-enrollment in DC plans, while others are more controversial
(Warshawsky 2007; Sirkin and Coffin 2008). One of the most hotly debated
topics is a provision expanding the delivery of plan participant investment
advice.
By including participant advice provisions under the PPA, Congress
effectively took the position that existing fiduciary requirements for partic-
ipant advice programs were too restrictive to allow widespread plan sponsor
adoption. Accordingly, relief from the prohibited transaction restrictions
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was needed. In
January 2009, the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) issued
final regulations outlining how to comply with PPA statutory exemptions,
and at the same time it created a new class exemption seeking to increase
the availability of participant advice while controlling potential conflicts of
interest (USDOL 2009).
Prior to the passage of the PPA, a 401(k) benchmarking survey showed
that about 40 percent of 401(k) plans had offered participant investment
advice programs for many years; the remainder had not offered advice due
to fiduciary concerns (Smith 2006). In early 2007, the number offering
advice had risen to 51 percent. Nevertheless, fiduciary concerns are still a
main reason that sponsors elect not to provide financial advice (Phoenix
and Dzierzak 2008). Therefore, while the PPA was somewhat successful in
increasing the availability of advice, it may have failed to fully address
fiduciary concerns. The Labor Department suggests that its new class
exemption will do much to alleviate these fiduciary concerns, ultimately
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resulting in 60 percent of plan participants having access to investment
advice.
This chapter addresses three important questions related to the PPA
advice provisions:
 How did advice programs operating prior to PPA deliver advice to plan
participants?
 Have eligible advice arrangements put forth under PPA both expand-
ed the availability of advice and better served plan sponsors and
participants thus far?
 Particularly with respect to serving the needs of plan participants, what
remains to be done?
Participant investment advice: a brief regulatory
and legislative history
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
The transition to DC pension ‘self-directed’ plans has meant that more
employees are now responsible for managing their own retirement saving.
For this reason, in 1996, the USDOL released Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 to
provide plan sponsors with clarifications regarding non-fiduciary partici-
pant education versus fiduciary investment advice. This release indicated that
plan sponsors may educate participants on such concepts as diversification
and historical return expectations for various asset classes and assist parti-
cipants with estimating future retirement income needs and assessing risk
tolerance. Such non-fiduciary education may go so far as to provide parti-
cipants with hypothetical asset allocation models and interactive software
built using ‘generally accepted investments theories’ and assumptions that
identify a ‘specific investment alternative available under the plan.’ To
comply, the model must identify the specific assumptions made, acknowl-
edge the availability of other similar investment alternatives in the plan,
and take into account (or ask participants to consider) individual circum-
stances and outside assets. Such models and related output materials are
not considered a ‘recommendation’ and thus do not constitute fiduciary
‘investment advice’ under ERISA (USDOL 1996).
In defining fiduciary investment advice, USDOL stated that this would
include specific recommendations to buy or sell securities, as well as
discretionary control over assets or a mutual agreement that the advice
will be the ‘primary basis for the participant’s or beneficiary’s investment
decisions.’ The Bulletin also confirmed that providing either non-fiduciary
education or fiduciary investment advice to participants would not cause
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the plan to violate ERISA Section 404(c), as the participant might choose to
accept or disregard the investment education or advice.
SunAmerica
The next definitive action by the USDOL on investment advice came in
December 2001 when USDOL issued Advisory Opinion 2001-09A to Sun-
America Retirement Markets. This advisory opinion concluded that a re-
tirement plan services provider offering its own investment options to plan
participants may also render participants investment advice and discretion-
ary managed account services, provided that an ‘independent financial
expert’ developed the recommendations for participants using objective
criteria. In so doing, USDOL determined that SunAmerica would not be in
violation of ERISA Section 406(b), which prohibits a plan’s investment
advisor fiduciaries from receiving additional compensation resulting from
participant investment advice. Some commentators (Ungurean 2004) have
noted that the SunAmerica Advisory Opinion was significant, as it outlined
a clear model under which retirement plan providers may now offer
‘independent’ investment advice and managed account programs, even
with the presence of their own investment options in the plan (USDOL
2001).
Failed legislation
Over the period 2001–5, both Democratic and Republican members of
Congress introduced competing legislation proposing investment advice
models that would shield plan sponsors from liability related to participant
advice. Notably, Rep. John Boehner (R-Ohio), Chairman of the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce, introduced the Retirement
Security Advice Act, which permitted advice from plan providers with
disclosures. Largely in response to this legislation, Sen. Jeff Bingaman
(D-New Mexico) later introduced the Independent Investment Advice
Act, which required that participant advice come from independent firms
not involved with the management of the plan’s investments. Neither Act
was ever passed into law.
The Pension Protection Act
Finally in 2006, PPA was enacted by Congress and signed into law by Presi-
dent Bush to address widespread pension funding issues and increase retire-
ment security. Along with addressing certain DC plan design features such as
auto-enrollment and creating Qualified Default Investment Alternatives
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/8/2010, SPi
88 Lynn Pettus and R. Hall Kesmodel, Jr.
(QDIA), the PPA added a statutory exemption to ERISA that, if followed,
permits the plan’s fiduciary investment advisor to provide participant invest-
ment advice under an ‘eligible advice arrangement.’ The advice provisions
in PPA effectively represented a compromise between the Boehner and
Bingaman proposals (but much closer to the Boehner approach) by permit-
ting a conflicted party to offer participant advice with controls.
Field Assistance Bulletin
Shortly after the enactment of PPA, USDOL issued a Field Assistance
Bulletin (FAB No. 2007-01) providing preliminary guidance on implement-
ing eligible advice arrangements under which a ‘fiduciary advisor’ renders
advice either by using a computer model certified to produce objective
advice, or by using a ‘fee-leveling’ approach. It also affirmed that past
guidance remained effective, and that plan sponsors need not operate
under a PPA-eligible advice arrangement. Additionally, it also reiterated
plan sponsors’ fiduciary obligations in providing participant investment
advice (USDOL 2007).
USDOL final rules
In 2009, USDOL issued proposed regulations that largely followed FAB
No. 2007-01, but further liberalized investment advice rules by introducing
a class exemption that goes beyond the statutory exemption defined under
PPA. Most significantly, under the USDOL class exemption, the fee-leveling
requirement applies only to the representative (person) providing the advice
to participants. It does not apply to fees received by the fiduciary advisor
(firm) responsible for the eligible advice arrangement. Consistent with FAB
No. 2007-01, the fiduciary advisor providing the eligible advice arrangement
is not required to be registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
and may be a bank, insurance company, or broker–dealer. The class exemp-
tion also allows the fiduciary advisor’s representative using a computer
model to render additional subjective ‘off-model’ advice under certain cir-
cumstances, with documentation. While these liberalized rules might con-
ceivably make advice more available, by removing certain barriers, they also
potentially increase conflicts of interest within PPA-eligible advice arrange-
ments by removing the requirement for representatives to follow the com-
puter-model recommendations and the requirement for firms to receive
level fees for the representative’s recommendations (USDOL 2009).
Final USDOL rules were filed in the Federal Register on January 21,
2009, and had an effective date of March 23, 2009. But the change in
presidential administration prompted the USDOL to extend the effective
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date by an additional 60 days and request further comment. As of the
writing of this chapter, part or all of the USDOL final rules are not
expected to go into effect without substantial rewrite, due to Congressional
disagreement over perceived conflicts of interest and liberalized rules that
could go beyond the statutory compromise.
Participant investment advice today
Despite the availability of the new PPA statutory exemption, the market
for participant investment advice today continues to be dominated by Inter-
net-based computer models developed by independent firms registered
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Independent providers are
distinguished in that they are not affiliated with the retirement plan’s asset
manager, and they do not sell financial products or provide brokerage
services to plan participants.
Business and delivery models
These firms typically sell their Internet computer-model services through
marketing alliances with retirement plan administrators, or directly to large
DC plan sponsors. Smaller advisory firms sometimes sell services directly to
individual plan participants, bypassing the plan sponsor. Some providers
exclusively offer participant investment advice while others operate large
diversified institutional investment advisory, research, and technology busi-
nesses.1
Most large retirement plan services businesses have entered into alliance
agreements with at least one independent advice provider to deliver Inter-
net-based participant advice via a computer model. Some co-market with
several advice providers to offer plan sponsors a choice of tools and advice
methodologies. Others have branded a single advice platform as part of a
‘bundled’ service with an independent advice provider’s computer model
(‘financial expert’) delivering the participant advice behind the scenes,
similar to the SunAmerica approach. Few businesses, if any, currently struc-
ture their computer-model platforms as PPA-eligible advice arrangements.2
While retirement plan services providers may be awaiting the fate of
USDOL final rules before establishing new PPA-eligible computer-model
arrangements, there are several reasons that providers might retain their
existing platforms. These include the widespread availability of third-party
computer models, the expense of creating new models, and the presence
of certification and annual audit requirements under PPA compared to no
such requirements for independent advice providers and SunAmerica
arrangements.
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The lack of retirement plan services providers delivering participant
investment advice programs via PPA-eligible fee-leveling arrangements
might be due to the prevalence of mutual fund revenue-sharing agree-
ments at the plan level, which include both the provider (fiduciary advisor)
responsible for the advice arrangement, and the financial advisor interme-
diary (firm or representative who sold the 401(k) plan to the plan sponsor)
responsible for providing investment advice to participants. Such agree-
ments complicate the implementation of fee-leveling, particularly if the
USDOL class exemption is not made effective.
Services and scope
Computer-model advice tools offer personalized asset allocation and invest-
ment recommendations based on a proprietary analysis of the retirement
plan’s investment options, coupled with an assessment of the participant’s
investment needs. These tools typically ask participants to input relevant
information such as age, income, assets outside the retirement plan, and
desired retirement age. The advice output includes educational materials
and graphics designed to provide the participant with portfolio return and
risk expectations as well as target saving levels. The output also may include
a Monte Carlo analysis, which might show a range of returns representing
90–95 percent (approximately two standard deviations) of calculated possible
future outcomes.3
In some cases, the plan provider, the advice provider, or the plan sponsor
may offer telephone-based counseling related to the advice tool or man-
aged account program. Managed account programs involve the advice
provider taking the extra step of implementing ongoing investment deci-
sions on a discretionary basis. Plan providers may also offer face-to-face
meetings in conjunction with the computer model. While participants are
more likely to use face-to-face advisors than any other delivery method
(Helman, Copeland, and VanDerhei 2006) of advice delivery, there can
be caveats to these interactions that we will explore further.
Fee structures
Independent computer-model advice providers, or plan providers
operating a program similar to that of SunAmerica, collect fees from the
plan sponsor, who may in turn pass through the cost of offering the advice
program (and related telephone or face-to-face support) by charging a fee
to each participant’s account. The advice provider may charge fees on a per
capita or assets-under-management basis. When an alliance relationship is
involved, the retirement plan services provider may offer education and
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investment advice for no additional cost as part of its ‘bundled’ platform
with an additional fee charged for managed account services. Generally,
under pre-PPA delivery models, provider representatives supporting the
computer model are salaried registered investment advisor representatives
or employees who do not receive additional compensation or commissions
from participants.
If a financial advisor intermediary (i.e., a commissioned representative
affiliated with a brokerage firm, wealth management firm, or life insurance
agency) is involved, there may be an informal or personal advisory relation-
ship formed between financial advisors and certain participants, such as the
business owner or its executives. Financial advisors unaffiliated with the
retirement plan provider may also find their way to the employer via
informal networking contacts with human resources, corporate business
leaders, or individuals at company locations to offer face-to-face financial
planning and out-of-plan advice services.
In these circumstances, the financial advisor might offer select plan
participants ancillary investment advisory services or insurance products
for assets outside of the plan’s formal advice platform. The financial advisor
intermediary’s affiliated financial institution will dictate the extent to
which fees and commissions are charged outside the context of the plan
(e.g., commissions from financial product sales, fees related to assets under
management, and brokerage commissions).
Limitations
Both the independent, online computer model (formal program offered
in the plan) and the financial advisor intermediary (informal program
offered outside of plan) have some limitations in providing participant
advice, irrespective of PPA.
Today’s sophisticated Monte Carlo computer models in both retirement
and investment advice programs are essential for performing stochastic
modeling that potentially could include all sources of retirement income
(e.g., Social Security benefits, DB pensions) and invested assets (e.g., IRAs,
taxable accounts). Aside from lacking Internet access at work, the issue for
most participants continues to be their lack of desire or financial knowl-
edge to accurately and confidently enter information into these tools or
understand the outputs without the assistance of a trusted professional.
Indeed, for most plan participants, the Internet is not the preferred meth-
od of obtaining advice (Helman, Copeland, and VanDerhei 2006). While
most are comfortable seeking general information from web sites, relatively
few trust the Internet for financial advice (Greenwald 2007). Fewer are
inclined to input the required personal information (from all of their
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various accounts) to obtain investment advice, and even fewer understand
advice tool outputs and investment concepts.
Such reluctance is further complicated by the behavioral tendencies of
participants to trust their own investment decisions for delivering their
retirement saving objectives (47 percent) over that of a professionally
managed account (25 percent). In cases where participants do access
advice, only 13 percent say they implement all of the advice (Helman,
Copeland, and VanDerhei 2006). Finally, online advice programs are not
designed to provide financial planning recommendations for participants
who struggle with debt or for those near retirement who are focused on
plan distribution options and long-term cash flow planning. Decisions
facing today’s plan participants approaching retirement include: when to
commence DB pension benefits, whether to elect an annuity or a lump
sum, when to begin Social Security benefits, determining the appropriate
level of cash reserves versus invested assets, whether to pay off their mort-
gage, and ordering and timing account withdrawals to minimize taxes.
Collectively, these decisions are difficult for plan participants to address
without the assistance of a financial planning professional.
There are also limitations to financial advisor intermediary or commis-
sioned representatives’ roles in providing financial planning advice. Fac-
tors to be considered relate to objectivity, quality, and consistency of the
advice delivered for each participant, as well as how wealth management
firms compensate these financial advisors.
One major issue is that dialogue and recommendations rendered during
face-to-face meetings between financial advisors and participants are sel-
dom recorded or archived. Consequently there are few ways to control
quality, consistency, or conflicts that may arise. For example, an insurance
agent, acting on a suitability (non-fiduciary) standard in providing out-
of-plan recommendations, might be trained by his or her field office to sell
more life insurance by instructing clients (plan participants) to limit their
plan contributions to the employer match level (e.g., 6 percent of salary).
Whole life insurance premiums, rather than additional plan contributions,
are then recommended as an alternative to additional plan contributions.
Issues also arise around the compensation structure of commission-
based financial advisor intermediaries, which incents advisors to focus
attention on executives and business owners rather than rank-and-file
participants, who arguably need the most help and have the fewest assets.
This compensation structure may therefore create inherent issues of un-
even participant access as well as conflicts of interest, irrespective of the
advice framework (i.e., SunAmerica or PPA).
Other problems with exposing employees to commissioned representa-
tives in the workplace include participants’ lack of ability to select the lowest-
cost option when it comes to investments (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian
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2010) and presumably other financial product decisions as well. Participants
might also view the recommendations and products offered by financial
advisors in the workplace as tacit plan sponsor recommendations. This can
lead participants to believe that they should work with these advisors (Pessin
2008) even if this is not the employer’s intent. Allowing commissioned
representatives further access to the workplace under PPA-eligible advice
arrangements will not change these dynamics, as PPA and USDOL only
focus on the conflicts related specifically to plan investment advice, not
financial product sales.
Participant issues
While retirement plan providers and sponsors continue to focus much
attention on participant needs with respect to plan investment advice,
significant problems for many participants exist outside the context of
selecting investments in their 401(k) plans. One need only look at the
current problems in the housing market to understand how severe
resource allocation problems are relative to selecting investment options
in 401(k) plans. Consider also that these serious financial problems can
exist when the employee receives regular paychecks from an employer.
With a lump-sum retirement benefit, the problem only worsens as these
same individuals must now create their own paychecks for 30 years or more,
juggling investment management, spending decisions, and unpredictable
health-care expenses.
To put the relative importance of competing saving goals into perspective,
the 2003 Employee Benefit Research Institute Retirement Confidence Sur-
vey showed that retirement saving was the most important long-term saving
goal for only 45 percent of employees. When short-term goals are included,
retirement was most important for only 30 percent of workers (EBRI and
MGA 2003). Though this objective was mentioned more often than other
saving goals, retirement is not considered to be themost important goal for a
majority of employees. Along these lines, a recent survey conducted by The
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board of 35,121 employees eligible for
the Thrift Savings Plan found that 23 percent believe they ‘do not have
enough money’ to contribute to the plan. However, only 4.3 percent were
not contributing because of dissatisfaction with the investment options and
only 2.2 percent were not contributing because the decision was ‘too com-
plex’ (The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board 2009).
These findings suggest that, if participant education and advice is to be
more effective, these must help participants understand how to allocate
their limited financial resources across competing goals–rather than simply
allocating their 401(k) investments.
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Factors affecting 401(k) plan advice
Trust
Participant financial problems may also lead to a breakdown of trust in
financial institutions, an important component in any participant’s deci-
sion to participate in a plan (Agnew et al. 2007; Vanguard 2008). Partici-
pants may also question the presentation of potential investment outcomes
due to recent financial shocks. As mentioned above, providers who show
90–95 percent probability calculations might not properly manage partici-
pant expectations when extreme market events become a reality, further
confusing and disheartening those who relied on investment advice and
stated return expectations in the past. Bodie (2003) illustrates this with a
discussion of the ‘fat tails’ of the equity return distribution. Ironically,
inertia has kept many from making changes to their allocations or contri-
bution levels in response to recent market turmoil (Benartzi 2008), but
trust in the system and in advice models may be further eroded nonethe-
less. In the present environment, advice programs funded in part by
ancillary financial product sales could further erode participant trust in
the plan sponsor and the plan provider’s motives.
Automatic solutions
It is possible that participant investment advice in 401(k) plans is giving way
to automatic solutions offered under the PPA, which are increasingly focused
on helping participants save and diversify their investments passively.
MANAGED ACCOUNTS
For example, with the enactment of PPA, third-party advice providers won a
major victory – not through the enactment of advice provisions, but
through third-party advice providers’ successful bid to include managed
accounts as a Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA) along with
risk-based ‘lifestyle’ and age-based ‘life-cycle’ funds. QDIA status has given
advice providers the opportunity to vastly increase the number of partici-
pants utilizing their advice through default investment managed account
programs offered under auto-enrollment programs. Although managed
accounts used as a plan’s QDIA are still the exception rather than the
rule, retirement plan services providers continue to expand their alliance
relationships with third-party advice providers, delivering managed ac-
count services to more participants as a plan option and as QDIA default
investments for auto-enrolled participants (Financial Engines 2008).
As a practical matter, the proliferation of managed account platforms as
a plan option tends to conflict with conventional lifestyle and life-cycle
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fund choices, as they steer participants away from these. A plan sponsor’s
communication efforts might also become unmanageably complex, if ad-
vice, managed accounts, and life-cycle funds are all offered. Plan sponsors
might question whether the additional fees and communications chal-
lenges are necessary when low-cost life-cycle funds (or institutional life-
cycle funds customized for the plan) might provide similar results with
more streamlined communications.4
One reason for plan sponsors to consider offering managed accounts as a
plan option or as a QDIA default investment comes from work by Benartzi
and Thaler (2007) that suggests that participants are not necessarily com-
fortable ‘putting all their eggs in one basket’ via a single life-cycle fund. This
propensity toward multiple funds is also demonstrated by the fact that only
13 percent of participants believe a life-cycle fund is the investment option
most likely to achieve retirement saving objectives, and only 11 percent
believe a balanced fund will attain this end (Helman, Copeland, and Van-
Derhei 2006). That study, and Benartzi and Thaler (2007), help explain the
misuse of life-cycle funds by over 70 percent of participants. Nevertheless,
few participants can accurately explain what the various options are, or their
differences. For this reason, enhancing financial literacy could help, though
managed account programs may also produce better results.
Managed account programs have certain advantages and seem to yield
positive results for participants (Charles Schwab 2007), but more research
is needed to determine whether these programs yield superior overall
results when compared to life-cycle funds. For instance, it would be useful
to ask whether managed account programs adequately retain participants
over the long-term and mitigate irrational investment behavior in times of
extraordinary stock market losses when compared to life-cycle funds. This
analysis is unfortunately complicated by the fact that aspects of managed
account performance are dependent on the underlying funds available in
each plan.
AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT
Studies also show the potentially negative impact on providing ‘tacit’ advice
to employees in areas such as plan saving levels. While some programs
providing contribution auto-escalation may mitigate this issue, most em-
ployers offering auto-enrollment today continue to have a 3–4 percent
fixed contribution rate (Phoenix 2008). This is often due to the significant
increased match costs of automatically escalating contribution rates above
these levels. Due to inertia, these 3–4 percent saving rates may prove to be a
long-term challenge for employers in making sure their workforce retires
with adequate replacement ratios through 401(k) plans alone–with or
without investment advice.
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The need to address this problem is further evidenced by a recent study
by Brady (2009) who suggests that employees may achieve acceptable
retirement income replacement ratios, including Social Security benefits,
by saving 4–10 percent of earnings. While this might be in line with
participant trends in traditional ‘opt-in’ programs, these rates are well
above the levels of most auto-enrollment programs. For example, if the
employer’s match is 50 percent of the first 6 percent of contributions, total
contributions for auto-enrollees are more likely 5–6 percent. The problem
of inadequate retirement fund accumulations is exacerbated by the fact
that auto-enrollment programs without auto-escalate features have
tended to create lower overall saving rates in 401(k) plans when com-
pared to participant saving rates in plans without auto-enrollment (Olsen
and Whitman 2007).
Increasing complexity
As employers move beyond investment advice toward automated solutions,
it is important to keep in mind the complexity involved in accumulating
and distributing ‘lump-sum’ retirement assets as discussed above. Even a
seemingly simple decision such as rolling over a 401(k) balance to an IRA
carries with it potentially complex tax considerations, such as Net Unreal-
ized Appreciation (NUA) on employer securities.
Another key consideration is creating a way for participants to automati-
cally continue receiving asset allocation assistance even after leaving
their employers. Since the median tenure for American workers is currently
4.1 years (USDOL 2008), the transfer of advice from one employer to
the next, and for multiple accounts is a key challenge. A recent survey of
Americans aged 55–75 with over $50,000 in savings found that 43 percent
held more than six accounts (including employer plans, IRAs, and transac-
tion accounts such as checking; Mottola and Utkus 2008b). As more future
workers rely on 401(k) plan assets for retirement, the number and complex-
ity of account management will only continue to grow.
Even if the participant’s current 401(k) plan is the only retirement saving
vehicle, the complexity of managing a lump sum to create a stream of
retirement payments is extremely challenging given inflation and longevity
risks. Relatively few elderly today rely on lump sums from employer-sponsored
plans as their primarymeans of retirement income (Ernst & Young LLP 2008;
Mottola andUtkus 2008a), but this will not be the case for future retirees. The
transition poses significant challenges from an educational and resource
perspective, going beyond what computer-model investment advice offerings
can effectively achieve for participants. Consider, for example, that future
advice might need to include income product selection (e.g., managed pay-
out mutual funds versus annuities). Employers will also confront a decision
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on how (or if) to automate this payment process and whether to provide
employees with payout options inside or outside the plan, and/or educate
participants on the universe of options beyond the plan for managing retire-
ment income derived from their 401(k).
Where do we go from here?
Several open questions still remain. For one, it is not yet clear whether
programs are delivering the right kind of advice and guidance to partici-
pants given their increasingly complex financial needs, which impact their
plan participation and saving levels. Investment advice programs focused
on accumulating assets are only part of the picture. While there is a need
for relevant financial planning assistance beyond what is delivered by
investment advice tools geared toward 401(k)s, how should plan sponsors
deliver these programs? Should plan sponsors be comfortable with the
PPA-eligible advice arrangements and USDOL class exemption, which, if
implemented, will increase the presence of commissioned financial service
representatives in the workplace? Face-to-face meetings with financial ad-
visors might help certain participants make broader financial decisions
beyond their 401(k) accounts, yet plan sponsors lack oversight over their
recommendations, the kinds of financial products offered, the uniformity
of participant access, and the methodology of the education or advice
provided.
Expanding financial planning while addressing broader conflicts
Clearly 401(k) plan automation will continue to grow in scope and popu-
larity. In the process, employers and plan sponsors may consider whether
money spent on providing investment advice could be better deployed
aiding participants in understanding broader personal finance issues
including guidance on allocating the paycheck to coordinate long-term
goals like retirement, immediate needs such as paying bills, and mid-term
goals like buying a home. Related education might include making efforts
to proactively assist with coordinating W-4 withholding calculations and
401(k) contributions, so employees decrease taxes withheld from their
paycheck while simultaneously increasing plan contributions, thus keeping
their paycheck levels unchanged. Such calculations can be easily per-
formed by a financial planner via an Internet calculator.
If plan sponsors demand an increased spectrum of education and advice
for participants, retirement plan services providers and other independent
providers might deliver these expanded financial planning services
through fee-only (salaried) professionals, without relying on the USDOL
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class exemption for their representatives. This model might combine a
high-touch approach of a professional financial planner with an indepen-
dent computer model subject to fiduciary advice requirements. If delivered
over recorded telephone calls, this approach would limit sponsor and
participant costs, assist in quality control, and reduce both real and per-
ceived conflicts associated with commissioned representatives. The scope
of permitted financial planning might address immediate needs (e.g., how
do I find money to save in the 401(k), pay off debt, how much house can
I afford, etc.) in order to better assist participants with meeting their
retirement saving goals.
To offer these services, financial institutions would need to train fee-only
(salaried) professionals to serve their workplace or plan sponsor clients, in
lieu of commissioned representatives. Such a holistic workplace financial
planning model might better comport with plan sponsors’ fiduciary re-
sponsibilities and sensibilities, while allowing participants to receive unbi-
ased (or less conflicted) financial planning from a trusted source without
the reliance on ancillary financial product sales to indirectly fund these
arrangements. Some financial institutions have already implemented a
similar model that complies with pre-PPA regulations and does not rely
on the USDOL class exemption for its representatives (Tyson and Palumbo
2008). Though certain conflicts might continue to exist at the plan provider
level, the most troubling conflicts, including the incentive to recommend
certain financial products in lieu of additional plan contributions, could be
mitigated if provider representatives are not financially motivated to market
these products to participants in the workplace.
Reevaluating the relative costs of participant education
and advice programs
Many plan sponsors, when seeking to move beyond traditional 401(k)
education and investment advice, may be concerned about the efficacy,
cost, and potentially uncertain fiduciary questions associated with these
new approaches. Given the mixed results in studies on the efficacy of certain
employer education programs (Hira and Loibl 2005; Benartzi and Thaler
2007; Olsen and Whitman 2007), employers will continue to ask where their
resources should be allocated in these areas. In this connection, a recent
study suggests employee financial stress might cost more than $15,000 per
affected employee (Financial Literacy Partners LLC 2008).
Another consideration is to put the cost of providing participants
with financial planning into context. According to Kopcke, Vitagiano,
and Muldoon (2009), asset management fees and trading costs make up
80–90 percent of a typical large employer’s plan costs. This is particularly
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significant given that decisions on saving levels, when to retire, and when to
collect Social Security benefits – rather than asset allocation or investment
selection – are often the most important factors in determining participant
retirement incomes (Mottola and Utkus 2008a; T. Rowe Price 2009). Yet
plan sponsors spend little time or money counseling participants on these
key decisions. Unfortunately, commissioned representatives again may be
ill-suited to provide participants with unbiased recommendations on these
issues, when ancillary (out-of-plan) financial product sales weigh heavily.
In the end, the overall cost of providing broader education and advice
programs through commissioned representatives might prove to be much
higher than fee-only programs delivered by the plan sponsor, if we include
the external commissions and fees paid by participants purchasing ancil-
lary financial products.
Leveraging automatic solutions to reduce the need for traditional 401(k)
investment advice
As plan sponsors continue to focus on automatic plan designs and QDIA
default investments, this will also reduce the need for traditional 401(k)
investment advice. This is because more participants will find themselves
automatically invested in diversified portfolios. In this event, education
programs could then focus on helping participants understand the QDIA
default investments and addressing important financial planning and
saving issues, rather than expending efforts to help each participant select
plan investments. Only engaged participants who choose to opt out of the
QDIA would require traditional investment advice, thus reducing overall
costs for delivering these services to the plan.
Conclusion
The Pension Protection Act led to a modest increase in plan sponsors
offering participant investment advice and managed account programs.
But to date, PPA-eligible advice arrangements have yet to take hold with
plan providers or sponsors, as the final rules remain in flux. Therefore,
formal participant investment advice programs today, while somewhat
more available than in the past, are not materially different than programs
offered prior to the PPA (notwithstanding the advent of QDIA managed
accounts). For this reason, advice providers seek to ensure that pre-PPA
SunAmerica arrangements continue to be permitted under any future
rulings.
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The complexity and interconnectedness of participants’ financial obliga-
tions–both immediate and long term–require effective participant educa-
tion and advice programs to move beyond the narrow focus on 401(k)
investment recommendations. If financial advisors can assist participants in
the workplace with these broader considerations, beyond the 401(k), the
regulators and plan sponsors will be able to consider the presence of
broader conflicts of interest as well as the plan’s ability to pay for services
beyond the context of traditional plan education and investment advice.5
More needs to be done to deliver better education and advice to partici-
pants and retirees without compromising plan sponsors’ fiduciary respon-
sibilities and sensibilities, or relying on certain participants to indirectly
fund the cost of advice programs through their purchase of ancillary
financial products.
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Notes
1 Examples of large independent providers who market directly to plan sponsors or
partner with retirement plan service providers under SunAmerica arrangements
include: Financial Engines, GuidedChoice, Ibbotson, Morningstar, and 401kTool-
box. Examples of smaller independent providers marketing directly to participants
include: StraightLine and Smart401k.
2 The following retirement plan services providers who collectively serve an esti-
mated 43,400,000 plan participants (PlanSponsor.com 2008; Financial Engines
2009) currently partner with an independent advice provider to offer plan spon-
sor clients access to participant investment advice under a pre-PPA or SunAmerica
model: ACS, ADP, Charles Schwab, Fidelity, Hewitt, ING, J.P. Morgan, Mercer,
Principal, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard.
3 The authors have reviewed advice tool disclosure statements from several provi-
ders. However, the description of Monte Carlo analysis is not meant to represent
any specific provider’s tool.
4 Managed accounts programs typically charge 0.2 to 0.5 percent of assets under
management. Retail life-cycle funds might include similar, or even higher, implic-
it asset allocation costs. Plan sponsors, particularly those with DB pension plans,
might negotiate fees with asset managers to pool assets under management
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reducing the cost of offering customized or institutional life-cycle funds to parti-
cipants.
5 USDOL final rules do not address these broader conflicts that directly affect plan
participants who receive advice from commissioned representatives (USDOL
2009).
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